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Brussets, December 1982
EURATOM :  The Commission proposes that fulL advantage be taken of the
common market in nuctear materiaLs for peaceful uses (1)
In accordance with both the sp'irit  and the Letter of the Euratom Treaty (signed on 25 March 1957), the Commission of the European Communities is proposing, on the initiative  of Mr Daivgnon, that the governments of the
Ten adapt to the circumstances  of the eighties the system set up by the
Treaty for the suppLy of nuc[ear materiats for peaceful uses. In practical terms, the commission is proposing a system that, whiLe putting
an end to the suppty Agencyfs buying and seLting monopoLy,  effectiveLy
estabLishes the unity of the "nuctear common market" with  the aim of
promoting soLidarity between Member States which have reaI industriaI
capacity in the fieLd and their partners. This r.louLd heLp the former to find outIets for their  nucLean industry and save the Latter from having
to embark on heavy investment out of aLI proportion to their  Limited
nucLear programmes. Such soLidarity aIso impties a common attitude towards
non-member  countries, some of which tend to make their exports conditionaL
on requirements that are detrimental to the unity of the Community market.
In its  proposat, the commission cleanty stresses the advantage of
concIuding agreements at Community teveL. If  such agreements cannot be
reached, the Member States retain the right to concLude biLateraL agreements,
as Iong as they receive the Commissionts prior authorization;  the principLe
of the unity of the market is therefore observed and the possibiLity of
incorporating these biIateraL agreements in an agreement at Community LeveL
remains ooen.
HistoricaL background
The Suez crisis  in 1956 spotIighted  Europers vutnerabiLity as regards o.iL
imports. It  was at this time and aga'inst such a background that Chapter VI of the originaI Euratom Treaty was drawn up.
It  was aLso during this period that nuctear energy was emerging as a serious
alternative to oi l.  The "nucLear  gambLe" assumerj that there r,,rcr.'"1 he a  i,..r'
technoLogicaL and industrial breakthrough together with reasonabLy secure
access to the requ'isite raw materiaL,  namely uranium.
Chapter VI, as conceived 25 years ago, estabLished  a Community  Supply Agency
under the supervision of the Commission and granted it  a true monopoly in
the buying and seILing of nucLear materiaLs, with the aim of ensuring that
users have equaL access to resources and of implementing a common suppLy
poL i cy.
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At the end of the fifties,  the Communityts nucLear eLectricity generating
capacity amounted to IittLe more than 50 Megawatts eLectricaL. By way of
comparison, in 1983 it  wj[[ exceed 50 000 MWe thus accounting for more tharr
20ll of the totat eLectiicity production in the Community of Ten. These
figures prove conctusive{y that nuclear energy has reached fu[[y industriaI
and commerciaL maturity in 1982.
Is it  revolutionary to propose an amendment?
No, on the contrary. The authors of the Eunatom Treaty expressLy provided
for such amendments to be made in accordance with an ad hoc procedure. Twice
in the past, in 1964 and 1970, the Commission has unsuccessfuILyproposed  that
Chapter VI of the Euratom Treaty be amended.  Today, especia[Ly in view of
the industriaI and commerciaL maturity attained by the nucIealindustry, it
is becoming increasingLy  evident that the provisions in force are out of
tune with the reaLities of the market in nuctear fuel materiats and services.
That is why the Commission considers that these provisions shouLd be adjusted.
The CommiSsion has consuIted industry and the governments
In preparing its action, the Commission was anxious to have as accurate as
possibIe a picture of the situation. It  therefore consuLted the nationaI
administrations  and the industriaL sectors concerneC. This in no way means
that the Commission has been content to comply,faithfu[Ly  with the wishes
of either side :  opinions differed appreciabty in certain cases. The
Commission has made a choice based on the fo[towing tHo basic princip[es :
(a)  the Communityrs  essential tasks remain those set out at the beginn'ing of
the Euratom Treaty (ArticLe 2), nameLy: "to ensure that aLL users in
the Community receive a reguLar and equitabLe supply of ores and
nuctear fue[s" and "to ensure wide commerciaL outLets and access to ths
best technicaI faciLitjes by the creation of a common market in
speciatized materiaIs and equ'ipment ...";
(b)  the new provisions must on the one hand [eave the nucIear industry as
much room for manoeuvre as possibLe so that it  can pLay'its part to ther
ful[,  whi[e on the other hand they must provide aLL the necessary
guarantees to ensure that action by Member States, undertakings  and
persons cannot harm the common interest, i.e.  reguLar and equitabLe
suppLies to a[[ users.
The main tines of the Commission proposaI
The Commission proposaL'is geared to five main objectives intended to evotve'
true sotidanity among the Ten.
EffectiveIy estabIishing the unity of the "nucLear  common market"
The advantageof such action is twofoLd :
(a)  Community  Member States that do not have the industriaL capacity
for a comptete nucIear fuet cycLe couLd re[y with greater confidence
on the others and avoid having to make investments incommensurabIe
with their nucLear pnogrammes.
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(b)  Those Member States that do possess fuet-cycLe technoLogy wouLd in
turn be ab[e to find wider out[ets for their nuc[ear industries,
since the tatter aLso have a roLe to pLay in exporting.
0n the whote, the proposed amendemenbshouLd resu[t in a greater rationatiza-
tion of investments and shoutd faciLitate trade in nuctear materiats  and
nucIear fuet services.
The principte of the unity of the market implies the generaL prohibition of
any restrictions on transfers of materiaIs within the Community, on imports
from non-member countries on on the use and storage of materials in the
Community. Does this mean that no exception can be contempLated? The
Commission thinks not, provided only that such exceptions are regutated
within a Community framework  so as to avoid any confLicting act'ion by
Member States and operators that couLd jeopardize the unity of the market.
2.  InternationaL  powers of the Community
(a)  The security of the Communityts nucLear suppIies may atso be jeopardized
as a resuLt of the action of non-member  countries, in view of the
Communityrs  dependance on imports of certain nuctear materiaLs and the
tendency of such countries to impose restrictions on nucLear trade that
are Liabte to af fect the un'ity of the market.
In order to mitigate this risk,  a common attitude towards non-member
countries must be adopted. It  shouLd preferabty be reftected in
agreements conctuded by the Community;
(b)  Cases may neverthetess arise in which the Community is not able or may
not wish to concLude agreements:  in such cases, the Commission must
authorize  Member States that so wish to concIude biIateraL aqreements.
Any such agreements must, of course, compty with the Treaty, in particutar
as regards the principte of the unity of the market, and must provide
for the poss'ibi Lity of their  being 'incorporated in an overatL agreement
at Community Ieve[; such incorporation must be faciIitated by the
Member State(s) concernedl
(c)  As regards exports of nucLear materiats, the principte of prior
authorization by the Commission has been maintained and'its app[ication
extended to aIt exports, in order to ensure that the Latter are
compatibLe  under a[[ circumstances  with the Communityrs generaL
interests.
The Commission takes the view that,  foLLowing the abotition of the
Supply Agencyrs monopoLy, the existing exceptions in this area are
no Longer justified.
3.  sotidarity measures in the evert of disruption of suppLies
Admitted[y, the risk of a disruption of suppLies is  tess in the case of
imported nuctear materiaLs than in that of o'iL, for exampLe. Uranium stocks in
the Community are at present equivatent to four yearst normaL requirements.
This does not, in the Commissionrs view, prec[ude the need to find a Community
sotution to any probLems that may arise.
To this end, the proposed system :
-  introduces a consuLtation  procedure designed to faciIitate  cooperat'ion
between Community investors;-4
-  maintains the Communityrs financiaL support for uranium prospect'ing
and extends it  to cover the territories of non-member  countries;
-  provides for the possibitity of buiLding up decentraLized buffer stocks
and, in the event of an imba[ance  between supply and demand, ol taking
appropriate action in the sphere of prices and import controLs.
4.  New rote of the Aqency
The Commission is proposing that the Supply Agency be retained - though with a
nodified roLe - as the chosen instrument for carrying out joint action in the
fietd of nuctear suppLies.
The Agency :
-  wi[[ scrutinize suppLy contracts - which wiLl have to be submitted to
it  once they have been concLuded - in order to check their conformity
with the new prov'isions of Chapter VI;
-  witL continue to perform its task of informing the Commission, the
Member States and operators about the status of and outLook for the
market in nuctear materia[s, in the Light of the contracts and data
submitted to it  and of surveys it  may carry out;
-  wiIL make a decisive contribution to the implementation  of sotidarity
measures.
5.  Supervision and penaLties
In order to ensure that the new provisions it  is propsos'ing are compIied with,
the Commission proposaL introduces a system of specific supervision and penatties.
The oenaLties scheme enabIes :
-  contracts that do not compLy with the new provisions to be decLared void;
-  the Commission to impose fines and periodic penaLty payments in aLL cases
where these provisions are infringed.
The supervision scheme provides for :
-  the text of aLL supply contracts to be communicated in extenso to the
Agency within a strict time timit aften they have been conctuded, the
Commission being required to give a very earLy ruting on whether or not
they are in conformity with the proposed new provisions;
-  the possibil.ity of making on-the-spot checks to determine whether the
abovementioned  obLigation to communicate the text of agreements has indeed
been futfi LIed.
ConcLusion
The Commission takes the view that the suppty arrangements  outLined above wouLd
make it  possibLe to achieve the essentiaI aims of  the Euratom Treaty regard'ing
supplies, white giving economic operators the freedom of action they are
entitted to expect in view of the deveLopment the nucIear industry has undergone.
These arrangements are atso fu[[y  compatibLe with the commitments  entened into
at internatbnaL LeveI by the Community and/or the Member States as regards the
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EURATgM: La Commission propose de faire jouer A pLein le "march6 commun"
des mati6res nucL6ai r"es A uti Lisation pacifique (1)
Conform6ment e L'esprit et A La Lettre du Trajtd Euratom (sign6 Le 25 mars 1957),
La Commission europdenne propose aux gouvennements des Dix, 6 L'initiative
du Vice-Pr6sident Davignon, dtadapter aux circonstances  des anndes '80, Le
169ime d'approvisionnement des mati6res nucL6ai res A uti Li sation pacifique
pr6uu par ce Trait6. En termes prat'iques, La Commission propose un r6gime
qui, tout en mettant fin au monopoLe d'achat et de vente de LrAgence
dtApprovisionnement, r6aLise effectivement L'unit6 du "march6  commun
nuc[6aire" en vue de pronouvoir La solidarit6 entre pays qu'i disposent
drune vnaie dimension 'industrieLLe  dans Le secteur et Leurs partenaires.
(eLa favoriserait Les ddbouch6s de L'industrie nucL6aire des prem'iers et
offrirait  La possibiLite aux seconds de ne pas devoir se Lancer dans des
jnvestissements  Lourds, sans rapport avec Leur programme  nucL6aire Limit6.
Cette soLidarit6 impLique par ai tLeurs une att'itude commune vis-A-vis des
pays tiers dont certains ont une tendance A assortir leurs exportations
de conditions contraires A L'un'it6 du. march6 communautaire.  Dans sa proposit'ion,
La Commission souLigne cLairement Lravantage de concLure des accords au niveau
de La communaut{. A ddfaut de ceux-ci, les Etats membres conservent Le droit
de concLure des accords biLatdraux, mais iLs devront au pn6aLabLe recevoir
Lrautorisation de La Commission afin que soit respect6 Le principe de Lrunit6 du
march6 et que Les possibiLitds de reprendre ces accords biLat6raux dans un
accord au niveau de La Communaut6 restent ouvertes.
RappeL histolique
La crise du Canal de Suez (956) avait concr6tement 6tald au grand joui" La
vuLn6rabititd de LrEurope A L'6gard du p6troLe import6. Crest A cette
6poque et dars ce contexte qu'a 6t6 conqu Le Chap'it re VI du Tra i t6 Fu'atorn
originaL.
C'est A cette 6poque aussi que L'6nergie d'origjne nucL6aire apparait comme une
atternative s6rieuse au p6troLe, Le "pari nucL6aire" 3tt;:posait trn'' per^c.6e
technoLogique et industrieLIe de grande envergure et un accAs raisonnabLement
garanti A La matiAre premi6re ndcessaire,  I'uranium.
Le Chapitre VI, tel  qu'iL a 6t6 congu iL y a 25 ans, accorde i  une agence
communautai re d'approvisionnement,  pLacde sous Le cont16Le de La Commi ssion,
un v6ritabLe  monopoLe d'achat et de vente des rnatidres nucL6ajres dont les buts
sont d,assurer aux utiLisateurs Lt6gaL accds aux ressources et de mettre en oeuvre
une pol"itjque commune d'approvisionnement-
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A La fin des ann6es'50, La capacit6 de production d'6Lectricit6 d'origine
nucL6aire dans La Communautd d'aLors 6tait A peine supdrieure A 50 Mdgawatts
6lectriques. A tjtre  de comparaison eLLe d6passera en 1983 Les 50.000 M6gawatts
6Lectriques  en contribuant ainsi pour pLus de 20% a La production tota[e
dt6Lectricit6 dans La Communaut6 A Dix. Ces chiffres prouvent bien que Le
secteur nucL6aire a atteint une maturit6 industrie[[e et commer'c'iaLe'ind6niabLe
en '1982.
Est-ce rdvoLutjonnaire de proposer une modifjcation?
Non, au contraire  m€me. Les auteurs du Traite Euratom ont pr6vu de teLLes
modifications  de mani€re expLicite et seLon une proc6dure  ad hoc. A deux
reprises, dans Le pass6, en 1964 et en 1970, La Commission a d'aiLLeurs
propos6, sans succAs cependant, de modifier Le Chapitre VI du Trait6 Euratom.
A pr6sent, en raison notamment de La maturit6 industrieILe et commerciaLe
atteint* par Le secteur nuc[6aire, [e manque de correspondance  des dispositions
en vigu ur avec Les r6aLit6s du march6 des matidres et services en combustibLes
nuc[6ai,.es est de plus en pLus 6vident. Crest La raison pour LaqueLLe la
Commission eonsid$re que Lram6nagement  de ces dispositions s'impose.
La Commission a Ilris [e pouLs de Lrindustrie et des gouvennements
Pour prdparer sa d6marche, ta Commission a tenu A disposer de La meiLLeure
photograph'ie possibLe de La situation. ELte a consuLt6 ainsi Les admin'istratjons
nationaIes et Ies miLieux industrieLs concern6s. CeLa ne signifie nutLement  r;ue
La Commissjon se soit content6e de recopier fid6tement tes d6sid6rata des un:
et des autres: dans certains cas les avjs d'ivergent sensibLement.
La Commission a opdr6 un choix bas6 sur Les deux princ'ipes fondamentaux
sui vants :
a) Les missions essentieLles de ta Communautd  restent ceLLes qui figurent en
tete du Trait6 Euratom (articLe 2), A savo'ir: "veiLLer A Lrapprovisionnement
r6guLier et 6quitab[e de tous Les utilisateurs de La Communaut6  en min6rais
. et combustibLes nucL6aires" et "assurer de Larges d6bouch6s et LraccAs  aux
meiIteurs moyens techniques par La cr6ation drun march6 commun des mat6rieLs
et 6quipements sp6ciaLisds...."
bJ Les nouveItes dispositions doivent, d'une part, Laisser A L'industrie
nucLdaire une marge de Libert6 dtaction aussi Large que possibLe afin de
pouvoir jouer pLeinement son 16Le et, dtauire part, fournjr toutes Les
garanties n6cessaires pour que Le comportement des Etats membres,  des
entreprises et des personnes  ne puissent pas nuire A Lrint6r6t commun,
crest-A-d'ire,  A ttapprovisionnement r6gulier et 6quitabLe de tous Les
uti Iisateurs.
Les axes fondamentaux de La proposition de La Cgmmission
La proposition de La Commission s'articule autour de cinq grands axes qui
visent A d6gager une vraie solidarit6 entre Les Dix.
1. RdaLiser effectivement  L'unitd du "March6 Commun NucL6aire"
Ceta pr6sente un doubLe avantage:
a) Les pays de La Communaut6 qui ne disposent pas
compLet A LtdcheLLe industrieLLe, pourraient s
confiance sur Les autres et 6viter de proc6der
disproportionn6s par rapport A [eur programme
d'un cyc Le nuc L6a i re





Les pays qu'i d'isposent de ce cycLe peuvent, drautre partr 6Largir
Les d6bouches de teurs industnies nucl6aires car ceLLes-ci ont
aussi une vocation i  t rexportation.
Au totat, iL devrait en d6couter une pLus grande rationaLisation  des
investissements et une plus grande faciLit6 pour Le commerce des matidres
nuctdaines et des services du combustible nucL6aine-
Le principe de Ltunit6 du march6 consiste en une interdication g6n6rate de
toute restriction aux transferts de mati6res a Ltint6rieur de La Communaut6
et aux importations en provenance  de L'ext6rieur ainsi que de toute condition
drusage et de stockage e Lrint6rieur de La Communaut6. CeLa signifie-t-it
qutauiune exception ne so'it envisageabLe? Nonrestime La Commission,  mais  A
condjtion quteLIe soit reg[6e dans un cadre communautaire  afin dr6viter des
initiatives disparates de Ia part des Etats membres et des op6rateurs,
susceptibLes  draffecter  L runite du march6  -
2-  Como6tences internationales  de ta Communaut6
a)  Des atteintes A trapprovisionnement nucL6aire de La Communaut6 peuvent
r6suLter aussi du comportement des pays tiers, en raison de la d6pendance
de La Communaut6 i  L'6gard de certaines importations nucL6aires'et  en
raison de La tendance de ces pays i'imposer des restrictions aux dchqnges
nucL6aires susceptibLes draffecter Lrunit6 du march6.
pour r6,duire ce risque, une attitude commune vers L text€rieur stimpose.
ELLe doit srexprimer de fagon pr6ferentieLLe par des accords concLus par
La Communaut6;
b)  Des cas peuvent n6anmoins se pr6senter ou La Communaut6 ne peut ou ne
veut concIune de te Is accords : Ia Comm'i ss'i on, dans ces cas, do'i t
autoriser Le ou Ies Etats membres qui Le d€'sirent d concLure des accords
bi Lat6raux.
Ceux-ci devront bien entendu Etre conformes au Tnait6, notamment au
princ.ipe de Irunit6 du march6 et pr6voir La possibiLit6 dr0tre repris
dans un accord gLobal, au niveau de La Communaut6; cette reprise devant
6tre faci Lit6e par Ie ou Les Etats membres concern6s;
c)  euant aux exportations de matidres nucL€,aires, Le principe de Lrautorisation
preaLable de La Commission est maintenu et son appLication a 6t6 6tendue
d LrensembLe  des exportations  pour assurer, en toute c'irconstance, La
compatibiLit6  de ceLles-ci avec Les int6rEts generaux de La Communaut6.
La Commission estime en effect que, suite d LtaboLition  du monopoLe de
I'Agence dtAprovisionnement,  Les exceptions existants dans ce domaine ne
se justifient ptus.
3.  Mesures de soLidarit6 en cas de perturbation dans Lrapprovisionnement
Certes, Les risques de perturbation sont moins grands dans le secteur des
matidres nucL6aires import6es, que pour Le p6troLe par exempLe' ActueLtement,
te niveau des stocks druranium dans La Communaut6 atteint 4ans de besoins
courants. CeIa ntemppche, estime la Commiss'ion, qut i L faut pouvoi r  faire face
sur Le ptan communautaire A dr6ventueLs  probLdmes.
Dans ce but, [e regime ProPos6  :
-  instaure un mdcanisme consuLtatif destin6 d faci L'iter La coop6ration entre
Les investisseurs de La Communaut6;
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maintient Le soutien financier communautaire A La prospection de
Lruranium, tout en LreLargissant aux territoires  des Etats tiers;
pr6voit la possibi Lit6 de const'ituer des stocks de s6curit6 d6centraL'i:;ds
et de prendre des mesures appnopri6es, en cas de d6sdquiLibre entre





4. Nouveau  16Le de L'Agence
La Commission propose le maintien de LtAgence dtAppnovisionnement, tout en
modifiant son rOLe, en tant qutinstrument priviLegi6  pour mener^ d bien une
action commune  dans te domaine de Lrapprovisionnement.
5.
Lr Agence :
-  e\(aminera Les contrats drapprovisionnement  qui devront lui  6tre soumis
epres concLus.ion, pour en verifier  La conformit6 aux nouveLLes dispositions
du Chapitre VI;
-  continuera sa mission drinformation de La Commission, des Etats membres
et des op6rateurs sur La situat'ion et Lr6voLution du mar"ch6'des matidres
nucL6airesipartirdescontratsetdesdonn6esqui|uisontcommuniques
ainsi que sur La base des enquates qu'eLLe pourra effectuer;
a
-  contribuera dtune manidre d6terminante/ La mise en oeuvre des mesures oL:
soLidarite.
Cont16le et sanction
Afin drassurer Le respect des nouveLtes dispos'itions  qurelLe propose, La
commission  pr6voit un systdme de sanctions et un regime de cont16Le sp6cifiques"
Le systdme de sanction est cent16 :
-  sur La nuLLft€,des contrats ne respectant pas Les nouveLLes disposit'ions;
-  sur La possibitit6 pour La Commission de prononcer  des amendes et des
astreintes  dans tous Les cas d'infnaction A ces dispositions '
LC 169'ime de contr6te comPorte :
Ia commun'ication  'int6graLe ir LrAgence
ment dans un d6lai strict,  aprds Leur
se prononcen trds rapidement sur Leur
pnopos 6;
La possibi tite  de verifier  sur pLace
p16cit6e a bien ete respect6e.
de tous Les contr^ats drapprovisionne-
concLusion; La Commission devanl:
conformit6 au nouveau t 69ime
si  L'obLigation de communicat'ion
Conc  L us ion
La Commission considdre que Le regime drapprovisionnement  esqu'is 'i  ':i*dessus
permettrait  de r6atiser Les objectifs essentieLs du Trait6 Euratom en matidre
dtapprovisionnement  tout en donnant aux op6rateurs 6conom'i ques I rautonomie qr'rri ls
SOnt en drOit de souhaiter,  compte tenu de L'6volution qu'a connue Le secteur
nuc[6a'ire. IL est 6gaLement pLeinement  compatibLe avec Les engagen]ents pris
sur Le pLan intennational par La Communautd'et/ou par ses Etats mer'|bres  en
ce qui concenne L rapprovis'i onnement, Ituti Lisat'i on, la circuLation Et Le
contrOLe des matidres nucL6a'ires  -